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Abstract 
Prevailing accounts of the efficiency of subsidies for the nonprofit sector 
presume that the only alternative source of public goods is a single sovereign, 
controlled by a single median voter.  Tiebout sorting, however, also provides 
citizens with alternative bundles of public goods.  When these two systems are in 
place simultaneously, they may interact.  We present a model in which subsidies 
may affect not only the choice between nonprofit and government, but also the 
choice among governments.  Because nonprofits allow citizens to obtain alternative 
bundles of public goods without relocation, subsidies for the nonprofit sector alter 
incentives to relocate.  We show that this distortion in the market for local 
government may either increase or decrease welfare, depending on the nature and 
geographical scope of the good provided.  As a result, for some goods it is 
ambiguous whether subsidies for charity on net increase social welfare.  We also 
consider extensions involving simultaneous provision of similar goods of differing 
quality.    
JEL Codes: H11, H77, K29, K34, L33  
 Economic accounts of the nonprofit sector have to date largely neglected its 
relationship to sub-national governments.  In the standard model developed by Burton 
Weisbrod (1975), and elaborated on by Hochman and Rodgers (1986), Hall and Colombo 
(1995), and Rose-Ackerman (1996), subsidies for charity allow for the production of public 
goods beyond those preferred by the median voter.  This “supra-median demand” theory, as 
we will call it, assumes that voters have no alternative government to which they could 
turn for production of their preferred good.  That assumption is obviously untrue in a 
federation, at least as to goods that could plausibly be produced by sub-national 
governments.1  Indeed, under perfect Tiebout sorting there is no gap between supply of and 
demand for public goods.  Weisbrod acknowledges this counter-argument, but dismisses it 
in one sentence with the assertion that frictions on relocation will always leave some 
residual unmet demand.  (1975:178) 
 But the presence of frictions does not absolutely foreclose relocation as a means for 
satisfying demand for a public good that is unmet locally; frictions merely increase the cost 
of obtaining any given good.  Thus, in a federated system relocation and charitable 
formation stand side by side as alternative, and potentially competing, mechanisms for 
satisfying supra-median demand in any given sub-national jurisdiction.     
Other commentators have observed that private associations may compete with local 
governments to provide public or club goods.  For example, Ellickson (1982) identifies 
residential associations as potential substitutes for local government.  There is also a 
substantial empirical literature devoted to measuring the extent to which expenditures in 
one sector may crowd out expenditures by the other, co-located, sector.  (See, e.g., Becker & 
Lindsay (1994), Gruber & Hungerman (2007), Cheung (2008)).   
There has not yet been any examination, however, into whether the possibility of 
private substitutes affects agents’ choice of jurisdiction, nor into whether any such effects 
are normatively desirable.  In particular, in the United States many forms of charitable 
enterprise are tax-favored through the deduction for contributions to eligible entities.  
(I.R.C. §§ 170, 501(c)(3)).  If subsidies create significant inefficiencies in the market for 
providers of public goods, that might offer reasons to reevaluate, or at a minimum to 
consider redesign of, the legal regime providing subsidies for charitable formation.   
The model developed here suggests that, in fact, subsidies for charity distort the 
market for local government.  As noted, there is substantial evidence that a subsidy for 
charity affects a consumer’s choice between charity and government.  More surprising is the 
possibility that subsidies for charity may alter a consumer’s choice between two rival 
governments.  Because charitable production can substitute for government production, a 
consumer who is unhappy with the level or quality of public goods in jurisdiction one need 
not move, as Tiebout predicts; she can instead remain and supplement the inadequate 
government production with private charity.  Subsidies exaggerate this effect by increasing 
the likelihood that charitable production will be cheaper than relocation.2            
Whether these distortions reduce welfare depends on the nature of the particular 
public good to be produced by a given charity.  Welfare is most likely to be reduced in the 
case in which production of the public good also produces some negative externality, and 
that externality could be mitigated if the site for production of the good were moved 
elsewhere.   
The predictions of the model are also sensitive to how the purposes of the subsidy for 
charity are specified.  Weisbrod assumes that subsidies are intended to satisfy unmet 
demand for quantity: to open an opera house where none stands.  Others assume that a 
subsidy intended to spur increased quality operates identically.  (E.g., Gruber 2010).  But 
competition over quality implies that there is some possibility for crowd-out in either 
direction.  Once crowd-out is taken into account, the model predicts a lower likelihood that 
subsidies will reduce welfare. 
These predictions have potential implications for the design and implementation of 
any nonprofit-sector subsidies.  First, the crowd-out result implies that encouraging 
competition over quality between private associations and government might be a more 
desirable goal for the subsidy than the more expansive traditional view.3  Also, given that 
some but not all organizations will face crowd-out, the model provides an additional reason 
to provide for multiple tiers of subsidy, rather than simply tying the subsidy to the donor’s 
marginal tax rate, as is the case under present law.  (I.R.C. § 170).  Several other 
implications are developed at length elsewhere.  (Galle 2010, 2011). 
1. The Basic Model 
In a federation, individuals who are disappointed by the median voter’s failure to 
provide their preferred level of public good may move to another jurisdiction that is already 
providing that quantity of good, or may decide instead to form a charity in their present 
jurisdiction.  To get a sense of what effects the charitable contribution deduction has on this 
decision, let us begin with an individual’s decision about whether to purchase a given public 
good.   
If  the median voter is unwilling to pay for additional units, g, of a public good, an 
individual i who prefers more must bear its full cost, c.4  Conventionally, consumers 
purchase a good until the marginal utility from consuming an additional unit, 
g
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to its marginal cost, 
g
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.  Where there are positive externalities from production of the 
good, as in the case of the standard public good, society would prefer for i to purchase more 
of that good, until total marginal utility all citizens derive from the good equals marginal 
cost,  
g
U


 =           (1)   
This is the traditional explanation for the subsidy: it is designed to reduce i’s 
effective cost to below her perceived gain, so that she consumes more of the good.  (E.g., 
Hochman & Rogers 1986, Steurle & Sullivan 1995.).  Ideally, the subsidy changes i’s net 
costs, so that her discounted marginal cost is at or just below marginal utility: 
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where α is the percentage of the subsidy provided for charitable contributions, and is set 
such that the product  is equal to the marginal utility of an additional unit for other 
agents (Cornes & Sandler 1996: 74-76),   is the deadweight loss resulting from the 
increased federal tax needed to pay for the subsidy, and p is the total national population 
paying the subsidy.5   
Contrary to the assumptions underlying equation (2), however, charity can also 
reduce others’ welfare without directly impacting the consumer of the charitable good.  
Kaplow (2008) argues that charity might distort labor/leisure decisions.  Redistributive 
charities, such as soup kitchens and free health care, can induce moral hazard, while an 
abundance of recreational or leisure charities might make leisure relatively more attractive 
than work.   McCormack (2010) also notes that individuals can have personal or ideological 
objections to the production of some public goods.  
 Taking these possibilities into account, the net social gain or loss from i’s decision to 
produce another unit of the public good herself can be given as: 
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where U represents the total utilities (either positive or negative) derived by the citizens of 
jurisdiction one, including i, and e is externalities accruing outside jurisdiction one.  
We add to Kaplow and McCormack’s accounts by noting that, crucially, negative 
externalities that would arise in jurisdiction one if the good were produced there may not 
arise at all if the good were instead produced in jurisdiction two.  Consider a homeless 
shelter, which might give material succor or emotional satisfaction to some, but also annoy 
NIMBY-minded neighbors.  Those who view a town with an additional shelter as fairer 
might be willing to, but prefer not to, move in order to effect justice.  If they relocated to a 
like-minded town, those who object would no longer suffer the disutility of living near a 
shelter.  But the shelter-builders have no reason to depart; they do not bear any of the 
unhappiness of their neighbors.   
More prosaically, suppose that the median voter, after applying cost-benefit 
analysis, determines that the current level of wildlife-protection enforcement is optimal; 
any greater amounts, she deems, will not be worth the cost of deterring possible business 
investments.  Now suppose some citizens place a higher value on additional increments of 
wildlife protection, and form a “save the whales” charity to identify and picket offending 
local business.  Here again, the ideal result in terms of social welfare would be for those 
who favor more wildlife protection to relocate to a region with more stringent wildlife-
protection laws.  Because they are indifferent to the (negative) effects of their charitable 
works on other voters, however, they do not go. 
The possibility that moving may eliminate negative externalities is significant 
because moving to a town where the desired level of the public good is already produced 
may be an alternative to purchasing in jurisdiction one.  Where that alternative exists, if i 
moves, she must pay moving costs,6 and now will be subject to a proportionate share of the 
tax needed to pay for the good (as well as bearing some of the deadweight loss of the 
resulting tax), such that the cost to her is: 
 m + 
2p
g
c


 + 
2
2
p
g
c



         (4) 
where m is the cost of moving,  2 is jurisdiction two’s deadweight loss resulting from 
collecting taxes in the amount c, and p2 is the population of jurisdiction two.7   
 Thus, in the absence of a subsidy, the individual moves where: 
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 Under standard assumptions, the marginal utility curve will always be above the 
marginal cost curve at any point prior to equilibrium, and so equation (5) implies that i will 
move when the moving costs curve cuts the marginal cost curve. 
 If i moves, net social welfare is simply:8 
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 Therefore the net social gain or loss from i’s decision to stay rather than move when 
moving costs and marginal cost are equal is (3) minus (6): 
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 In general, equation (7) is ambiguous whether staying would increase or decrease 
social welfare.  If the welfare effects of another unit of charity in j1 (other than the effects on 
i) are negative, staying reduces welfare.  If so, i’s decision to move might actually make 
society better off: by moving, i removes the negative externalities without reducing her own 
welfare. 9    
 The importance of moving to the welfare effects of a charity suggests that any 
changes in i’s decision to move will also affect total utility.  As we will now show, subsidies 
for charity diminish the likelihood that any given consumer i will relocate; this effect 
reduces welfare when moving would increase it, and vice-versa.     
 When there is a federal subsidy for charity, individuals are less likely to move 
because moving entails forgoing the benefit of the subsidy.  Recall from equation (2) that 
subsidies change the cost of purchasing an additional unit in j1 to (1- )
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.  Substituting this new discounted cost into equation (5) yields the prediction that i 
will move when: 
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 More simply, when the population p is very large relative to the marginal cost, i 
moves when the cost of moving intersects the discounted marginal cost curve: 
 m +  +   (1- )        (9)   
 Thus, the effect of the subsidy is to change behavior where: 
 (1- )  < m +  +  <       (10) 
 That is, whereas i would ordinarily have moved any time that moving were below 
marginal cost, in the presence of the subsidy she now will stay in jurisdiction one when the 
cost of moving is below marginal cost but still greater than (1- ) times the marginal cost.10  
The larger the subsidy amount  , the greater the likelihood that i will stay rather than 
relocate.  This change is the key distortive effect of the subsidy, as illustrated in figure 1. 
 <fig. 1>   
 In the absence of subsidy, i relocates when her moving costs intersect the marginal 
cost line, at A, which corresponds to point C on her marginal utility curve: well before 
equilibrium.  In the presence of the subsidy, however, the moving costs curve does not 
intersect marginal cost until point B, corresponding to point D on the marginal utility 
curve: well past the original, unsubsidized, equilibrium.  So subsidies shift the moving 
point, in effect increasing the amount of the public good produced in jurisdiction one.   
What are the welfare effects of this distortion?  Because the subsidy amount must be 
paid for through taxes, the welfare resulting from a decision to stay differs from that given 
by equation (7).  We have to add a new term to (3) to account for the deadweight costs 
resulting from the tax hike,11 so if i moves when m = (1- )
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Or, in English, the result is the net welfare from the marginal unit for everyone in j1 but i, 
less the cost of paying for i’s subsidy, plus any extra-jurisdictional effects. 
 But this represents only the welfare effects of i’s decision to purchase a single unit of 
the public good.  When i moves, she also no longer purchases in j1 any of the additional 
units, all the way up to the equilibrium point, that she would have purchased had she not 
moved.  So the full welfare effect of a move is loss of the summation of all these forgone 
purchases between the point where i moves and the equilibrium.  When there is no subsidy, 
that result is:12 
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 By comparison, when there is a subsidy, the result is: 
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 These integrals are somewhat intractable, but the intuition they represent is 
straightforward, as illustrated in figure 2.   
 <fig. 2> 
 The region summed under the subsidy in equation (13) is mathematically similar to 
the region summed in equation (12) but is shifted rightward.  In figure 2, social surplus 
from production of the good is represented by the rough triangle formed by the marginal 
utility and net social cost curves, with its vertex at point B and extending left to the y-axis; 
social loss from excess production of the good is represented by the triangle BCH.  In the 
absence of a subsidy, i moves when her marginal utility is at D, where moving costs 
intersect her marginal cost curve.  Since she moves, no additional units of the good are 
produced in jurisdiction one, resulting in the loss of the surplus represented by the triangle 
BFJ.13  But the relocation also prevents i from consuming the incremental units between B 
and A on her marginal utility curve, avoiding the social overproduction, with welfare 
consequences represented by the similarly-sized triangle ABH.  So on net, the welfare 
effects of the move are unclear.  In contrast, under a subsidy, i does not relocate until her 
marginal utility reaches G, the point corresponding to the point at which moving and 
discounted marginal costs are equal.  This permits additional overproduction, resulting in 
the loss triangle BGI.  That triangle is obviously much larger than the surplus BFJ, so on 
net the subsidy is clearly welfare-reducing: it has permitted more losses than it has 
prevented gains.14     
 More generally, the welfare effects of a subsidy depend on the consequences of a 
rightward shift in the region affected by a move.  If the line running upwards from point E, 
the moving point under a subsidy, intersects the marginal utility curve in a region where 
there is still net social surplus, then the subsidy increases welfare:  it allows additional 
production of welfare-increasing public goods.  If instead (as in figure 2) point E 
corresponds to a region in which social welfare is decreasing, then the subsidy is likely to 
reduce welfare: it allows additional production of welfare-reducing public goods.  This effect 
may be counter-balanced by any surplus that was also created as a result of the rightward 
shift.     
Equation (13) also implies that gains and losses are generally magnified by the size 
of the subsidy.  The larger is  , the greater the shift rightwards, and hence the larger the 
change relative to equation (12).  Moreover, equation (13) is somewhat more likely to 
produce a positive result (implying welfare losses from a subsidy) because of the added costs 
of the subsidy and its accompanying deadweight loss.  
 Put more simply, subsidies for charity may well reduce welfare.  Where the welfare 
from i’s decision to stay is negative, society would be better off if she moved.  But the 
subsidy discourages i from moving, and the larger the subsidy, the more likely that result.  
 Of course, the model captures only the welfare effects of the subsidy on a single 
individual; to determine whether subsidies for any given public good are efficient, we must 
sum the results across all individuals who can claim the subsidy.  In making this 
assessment, the cumulative results of equation (13) are not the only, and may not even be 
the most important, input.  Suppose, for example, that the subsidy level cannot be set to 
match perfectly the optimal level of the good, even exclusive of negative externalities.15  
Indeed, in the United States the subsidy amount is not tailored to either donor preferences 
or to the form of public good provided, but instead determined entirely by the donor’s 
marginal tax rate and other largely irrelevant factors.  (Gergen 1988).  For any given 
subsidy level, then, there will exist some donors for whom 
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subsidy is not tailored, these donors can still receive the subsidy, increasing deadweight 
losses with no corresponding increase in production of the good.  (Sherlock & Gravelle 
2009).  Our model offers no new insights into the effects of this excess subsidy, but it is an 
important factor when comparing the relative welfare effects of subsidies under crowd-out 
and no crowd-out, as we now will show.         
2. Crowd-Out Considered  
The model thus far assumes, as Weisbrod does, that the goal of charity is to provide 
public goods that the relevant government does not.  In actuality, however, charity and 
government may overlap.  Casual observation and introspection suggest that donors may 
contribute to charity in order to obtain superior quality of a public good already offered by 
government.  Broadening the goals of charity in this way also affects the predictions of our 
model. 
 In particular, allowing for within-jurisdiction competition over quality introduces 
the possibility of crowd-out.  If the reason the donor gives to charity is simply because she is 
dissatisfied with the quality of the available good, she is in effect paying for it twice: once 
through her tax dollars, and again through her donation.  Depending on the demand 
function for higher-quality goods, government provision of low-quality goods may crowd out 
charitable provision of superior alternatives.  (Peltzman 1973).16     
 Initially, it is unclear whether crowd-out affects the welfare losses from distorting i’s 
choice of jurisdiction.  As before, the losses are from lost opportunities to eliminate negative 
externalities.  It is not evident that negative externalities are any more or less likely to 
result from improvements in quality than from an increment in the quantity of a public 
good.   
Nor is it readily apparent whether welfare-reducing distortions of the decision to 
relocate are more or less likely when costs are increased to account for the proportionate 
tax price of the redundant government-provided good.  Where there is crowd-out, i’s costs of 
achieving utility 
*
iu , her utility from an incrementally higher-quality unit of that public 
good, become: 
 
g
c


+ 
1p
c
+ 
1
1
p
c
         (14) 
That is, i must now pay both the cost of producing the good as well as her 
proportional share of the tax cost of the redundant good, as well as bearing the deadweight 
losses from that tax cost.17    As a result, a subsidy now will change i’s decision to move 
when: 
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This implies two offsetting effects.  On the one hand, it is more likely that m will be 
less than the increased cost of staying given by equation (14).  But it is also more likely that 
m will no longer exceed the increased discounted cost of staying, (1-α) + + .   The 
gap between the two remains the same size, so without knowing how m is distributed we 
cannot know whether the shift upwards in cost affects the likelihood of m falling into that 
space.     
 In contrast, crowd-out does unambiguously reduce deadweight losses associated 
with inflexible subsidies.  Recall that where 
*
iu  > , any subsidy is strictly welfare-
reducing: money spent on donors who would have bought the good anyway reduces the 
treasury-efficiency of the subsidy, since each dollar of subsidy produces $0 of additional 
public good.  In general, though, the level of subsidy must be set in the abstract, before the 
government can observe the exact demand function of its citizens.18  So there is always a 
risk that any given subsidy level will be wasted; when this risk is summed across the 
population, the waste contributes to a net negative effect of subsidizing a given good.   
Waste is smaller for goods subject to crowd-out because of the greater need for 
subsidies.   There will be fewer citizens for whom   > + +  than for whom   
> 
g
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 .  At any given subsidy level, then, waste is smaller, so that when the welfare effects 
of that combination of subsidy and good are summed across the population the result is 
more likely positive overall.19     
   Therefore, although in general the exact welfare effects of a subsidy remain hard to 
predict, the double-payment problem at least makes it more likely that the subsidy is 
efficient.  While charity is possibly over-produced in Weisbrod’s scenario, here crowd-out 
makes charity more likely under-produced, so that the deduction brings total output closer 
to the social optimum.     
 However, this second-best story is harder to tell in the case where potential donors 
all reside in the same jurisdiction.  In that event, the donors can avoid double payment by 
the simple expedient of banding together to vote or lobby to cut spending on the low-quality 
government service.  (Becker & Lindsay 1994, Gillette 2009).  Although they will face the 
ubiquitous free-rider problem in their efforts, the subsidy greatly aids their cause by 
forming charities, which allow donors easily to identify others who are similarly situated, 
transact face-to-face with those others at charity events, and hire staff who can coordinate 
their efforts.  (Tollison 1982).   
In addition, co-located consumers can avoid coordination problems that might face a 
coalition spanning multiple jurisdictions.  Consider, for example, a private school open to 
students from several neighboring districts.  In order for contributors to the private school 
to lower the public education costs of all of them, they must deliver political rents to several 
separate groups of politicians.  Unless all lobbying is simultaneous, contributors who have 
already obtained low school taxes might refuse to aid others who have not; anticipating 
this, none of the contributors may assist one another.   
 In short, co-located consumers can much more easily combine their donation with a 
vote to lower their taxes.  For example, Becker & Lindsay (1994) find evidence that 
charitable giving to education reduces local government education spending.  In these 
instances where charity “crowds out” government, the deduction may again over-produce 
charity.     
 This analysis implies that the amount or availability of subsidies for a charity 
should depend on where its supporters reside.  Admittedly, a rule that makes the subsidy 
vary depending on where donors live may seem hard to administer, but this obstacle is 
perhaps superable, as we will describe. 
3.  Implications 
Our model here suggests that the traditional efficiency rationale for charitable subsidies 
is incomplete.20  Increased charitable production of public goods is most likely to increase 
social welfare in those cases in which the geographic distortions we have outlined do not 
arise.  For example, as we have noted, the prediction of welfare-reducing distortions is in 
significant measure dependant on the assumption that the good produces geographically-
restricted negative externalities.  Goods for which this is not true, such as consumer 
protection (where, depending on incidence, harms may be distributed nationally across the 
shareholders of affected firms), will be better candidates for subsidy than the class of all 
public goods.   
Similarly, the distortion does not arise in the case of goods for which there is no market 
for local government production, such as for goods that are national in scope.  Public goods 
that create significant externalities for other jurisdictions --- the e term in the model --- may 
be impossible to obtain by moving.  Municipalities might under-produce public goods 
benefitting a wide geographical area, since each individual town has incentives to free ride 
on others’ efforts.21  (Ellickson 1982).  It would be surprising, for example, to see one city try 
to save the world’s whales.22  The deduction is less likely to reduce social welfare for these 
kinds of national-in-scope projects, because charities are less likely to have any sub-
national government competition.  So in that scenario the world looks more like Weisbrod’s 
model in which there are only two possible sources of a public good, a government and a 
charity.   
In other cases a public good may still warrant subsidy, but to a lesser extent than other 
goods.  As we show in part 2, a subsidy that is large enough to overcome free riding when 
the marginal cost of a good is 
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whose marginal cost is only .  Government could grant a lower subsidy to entities that 
do not face double-payment, avoiding the over-subsidization problem.  A lower subsidy 
amount also mitigates the distortionary impact of the subsidy.  The distortion, again, arises 
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will reduce the size of this region.      
It is difficult to imagine an administrable system in which an organization’s subsidy 
depends on where its donors reside, but the nature of the good provided by the charity can 
be an effective proxy.  For local public goods, such as trash collection and parks, we can be 
fairly confident that the consumers are necessarily bunched closely together.  Other 
services are inherently non-local, such as theoretical scientific research or endangered-
species conservation; in all likelihood the funders of such goods are widely scattered and 
cannot effectively offset their charitable spending with reductions in local taxes.  Yet other 
services are somewhere in between, combining local benefits with additional spillovers that 
diffuse more widely, such as churches, schools, and public health providers.   
Furthermore, putting aside location, having flexible subsidy amounts allows a more 
efficient rate of subsidization.  Subsidies should be set at the amount that induces the 
optimal amount of charity, but currently the size of subsidy depends almost entirely on the 
donor’s marginal tax rate, which has no obvious relation to optimal giving.  If the 
subsidizing government (for example, the U.S. Treasury Department) can adjust the 
multiplier for each tier of subsidy, the subsidy rate can be decoupled from the marginal tax 
rate.       
Of course, it is well known that established subsidies for charity fall short of optimal in 
their failure to vary the subsidy amount with the social benefits of the subsidized good.  
(E.g., Reich et al. 2009).  But commentators have rejected any move towards an 
individualized assessment of any particular charity.  (Bittker & Rahdert 1976, Hall & 
Colombo 1991, Fleishman 2007:22-24).  In general, the claim is that allowing the 
government to decide which charities may receive the subsidy would leave novel, 
unpopular, or minority viewpoints unfunded.  Others suggest that majority control would 
fail to reveal preferences of voters with supra-majority tastes for public goods.  In both 
cases, the assumption is that any bureaucratic determination of the relative merits of 
charity would merely reflect officials’ preferences. 
Even assuming that this assumption is correct, the problem of bureaucratic bias is 
mitigated in the case of our proposal here.23  The geographic locus of a particular public 
good is a relatively objective question that can be readily answered in at least some 
instances.  If bias is a serious concern, lower subsidies can be reserved only for those 
organizations that are obviously free from crowd-out.         
4.  Conclusion 
 We have shown here that the leading normative justification for subsidized charity  
inadequately explains that subsidy.  The claim in the literature is that subsidies are 
welfare-increasing.  We show that, once interactions with local government are taken into 
account, in many cases it is ambiguous whether a subsidy would increase social welfare.  At 
best, then, the traditional justification is fully persuasive only in those instances, sketched 
here, in which the welfare-reducing aspects of the subsidy are mitigated.  For example, our 
analysis implies that the traditional rationale cannot explain subsidies for universities, 
hospitals, or social-service organizations, all of which can create localized negative 
externalities and are not fully subject to crowd-out.      
Accordingly, our analysis can be read to suggest that the subsidy should be available 
for a dramatically narrower class of organizations than are currently eligible to claim it.  
Given that the subsidy bears an estimated tax cost of $50 billion annually in the United 
States, and that eligible recipients account for on the order of one-seventh of U.S. GDP, we 
think this is a significant result. 
We note, though, that once nonprofits and local government are considered together 
as substitutes, new justifications for the subsidy emerge.  For example, the threat of 
nonprofit production of public goods might be desirable when Tiebout sorting is 
implausible, such as in conditions of high exit costs.  In that case, nonprofit production 
serves the competition function that is usually attributed to federalism.  We analyze these 
possibilities at greater length elsewhere.  (Galle 2011). 
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 We leave aside here questions about the usefulness of median voter theory generally; for more detailed 
examination of how criticisms of median voter theory affect Weisbrod’s rationale, see Krashinsky 1986, Kingma 
1997,  and Galle 2011. 
2
 We emphasize that the point is that subsidies make charity more affordable relative to the costs of relocation, 
and not as compared to the costs of local government.  Local government, too, is subsidized in some instances, 
such as for U.S. taxpayers not subject to the alternative minimum tax.  (I.R.C. § 164).  But this additional subsidy 
has only minimal effects on our model: § 164 changes the amount of public goods demanded by the median voter, 
but we simply take the median voter’s position as exogenously given. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
3
 These suggestions assume that the federal structure is constitutionally mandated while subsidies for charity are 
optional.  If, as might be plausible, there is some flexibility in the design of the federal architecture, then additional 
policy possibilities are opened. 
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However, by assumption the median voter’s marginal utility is lower than his proportional tax cost – otherwise he 
would have voted to impose taxes to produce the good.  That leaves i to pay the full cost on her own.   
5
 This form of the equation assumes, without loss of generality, that the subsidy is paid out of the national treasury 
(as is the case with U.S. federal subsidies for charity under I.R.C. § 170), rather than by jurisdiction one alone.   
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that latter instance, i would have purchased the good anyway, but society has incurred some deadweight losses to 
provide her with a subsidy.  (Sherlock & Gravelle 2009).   Note that this implies that unless the subsidy amount can 
be adjusted to every individual and every public good, subsidies will necessarily produce some unneeded 
deadweight losses.   
6
 Obviously, in the real world there are not an infinite number of jurisdictions, offering unlimited combinations of 
public goods.  Thus, the reader can conceive of “moving costs” as including trade-offs between the existing set of 
goods offered in j1 and those that will be bundled together with the public good in question in j2. 
7
 This form of the equation assumes for expositional simplicity that all other goods, and the individual’s 
proportionate share of the tax cost for them, are held constant.  We similarly assume that jurisdiction two is a 
closed economy, so that none of the tax cost or resulting deadweight losses can be shifted to another jurisdiction. 
 We also assume for simplicity that i does not receive a deduction for the cost of government in 
jurisdiction two.  Such a deduction is ordinarily available under the U.S. tax code (I.R.C. § 164), although often it is 
effectively unwound by the alternative minimum tax.  In any event, the only effect of allowing a deduction for the 
cost of local tax in jurisdiction two would be to decrease somewhat i’s costs of moving; the predictions of the 
model are unchanged.         
8
 Equation (6) appears to omit i’s cost of paying for the good.  However, on our assumption that the good is already 
in production in jurisdiction two, i’s tax contribution reduces the tax paid by others, netting out to a welfare cost of 
zero.  I’s relocation might actually slightly reduce the total cost of producing the good, if her presence allows a 
lower tax rate and thus a diminished deadweight loss.   
 Equation (6) also includes no term for any negative externalities.  This reflects two assumptions.  The first, 
as described in the main text above, is that local externalities can be eliminated through relocation.  To the extent 
that relocation does not entirely eliminate externalities, as in the case of deadweight losses from discouraging 
labor, the assumption again is that the good is already in production in jurisdiction two.  I’s decision to relocate 
does not affect whether or not those externalities exist. 
 For similar reasons, equation (6) also does not factor in externalities affecting citizens outside j2. 
9
 However, moving may also eliminate positive externalities for other jurisdictions.  But in many cases these will be 
zero, since for the marginal effect of e to be non-zero, there must be externalities derived from the production of 
an additional unit of the good over and above those already produced by j2.   
10
 More precisely, i will move when her expected surplus from all incremental purchases is higher in j2 than j1.  But 
that calculation is complex, and does not affect the core intuitions of the model.   
11
 The deadweight loss resulting from society’s purchase at cost c is only dαc, rather than dc, because only the 
subsidy portion of the payment need be financed through taxes.  The remainder of the cost is paid directly by 
citizen i.   
12
 This integral abuses notation a bit; the point is that the summation is from the point on the marginal utility curve 
where m intersects the marginal cost curve to the equilibrium point, where marginal cost and utility intersect.   
                                                                                                                                                                                           
13
 More precisely, since in the absence of subsidy there is no deadweight loss, the social surplus is BFJ, increased by 
the area between the deadweight loss curve and i’s cost curve. 
14
 Strictly speaking, only a portion of the net social loss is caused by the geographical distortion.  Some of the loss 
(represented in figure 2 by the triangle between the subsidized and unsubsidized marginal cost curves) results 
from the substitution effect in favor of the good caused by the subsidy.  But this distinction is unimportant for 
policy purposes.   
15
 In addition, the model abstracts away from two other factors that may be of some relevance.  For one, it 
assumes that there are no redistributive effects, but of course redistribution is one of the classic goals of charity.  
Our only point here is that the current conventional wisdom, in which sub-national redistribution is assumed to 
create inefficient deadweight losses but charity does not, paints an incomplete picture of the relative merits of the 
two mechanisms.      
Second, and we think less significantly, the model also presumes that the purchaser’s welfare does not 
depend on the source of the good.  Admittedly, some purchasers may have a “taste” either for private or public 
production, but it is controversial whether such preferences should count in the welfare function.  It might be 
argued that any “warm glow” feelings that accompany the provision of charity (see, e.g., Bernheim & Rangel 2005, 
Kaplow 2008), may be dependent on the form of the institution that provides the good, although there is no 
persuasive account in the literature for why this should be so.  For example, if voluntariness is a component of 
warm glow, then it is unclear why the decision to move somewhere to take on an added tax burden does not 
sufficiently demonstrate voluntariness.  School districts may be as much of a status symbol (see Glazer & Konrad 
1996) as donor plaques.    
16
 For discussion of empirical efforts to measure crowd out, see Kingma & McClelland (1995), Gruber & Hungerman 
(2007). 
 Of course, crowd-out could be eliminated with a 100% government matching grant, but prevailing subsidy 
rates are generally much lower.   
17
 As before, the predictions of the model are unchanged if we account for the possible deductibility of taxes paid 
to jurisdiction two.  Deductibility may reduce crowd-out to some extent, but assuming that taxes in both 
jurisdiction one and two would be deductible, the relative appeal of moving is unchanged.  
18
 As Kaplow (1995) notes, if government sets subsidies after observing demand, and this is known by donors, then 
donors may act strategically to extract a larger subsidy. 
19
 This assumes that subsidy levels are held constant across different goods.  If subsidies are increased selectively 
in order to account for potential crowd-out, then these increases may offset any cost-effectiveness benefits 
enjoyed by crowd-out goods.   
20
 Other efficiency stories, such as those suggested by Kaplow (1995, 2008) and Diamond (2006) are also 
incomplete to the extent that they do not currently include the possibility of welfare-reducing geographical 
distortions. 
21
 Whether localities in fact free ride on production of any particular public good with inter-jurisdictional spillovers 
is a complex and difficult question.  See Galle & Leahy (2009).   
22
 We are grateful to Louis Kaplow for this point.   
23
 For a more comprehensive response to the bias argument, see Galle 2011. 
